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The World’s Largest Dam Removal Project: The Klamath River Dams
Michael C. Blumm*
Dara Illowsky**
The Klamath River, draining some 12,000 square miles in southern Oregon and northern
California, was once the third largest salmon stream on the West Coast, the life force of
Native Americans. The river runs 263 miles from headwaters in Oregon and flows through
the Cascades to the Pacific Ocean south of Crescent City, California. The river is unusual
in that its origin is near the arid deserts of eastern Oregon and proceeds to run through
temperate rainforests of California through a considerable amount of federal and Tribal
lands.
The Klamath has been dammed for over a century for agriculture and electric power and
has been shrouded in controversy during the 21st century over the imperiled state of its
salmon and sucker fish, which are listed under the Endangered Species Act and to which
the Tribes have fishing rights. After a biological opinion led to irrigation cutbacks in 2000,
the Bush administration reversed course the next year, leading to a disastrous salmon kill.
The beneficiaries of this decision, Klamath basin irrigators, for two decades challenged the
2000 cutbacks as an unconstitutional taking, a claim rejected by the Federal Circuit in
2019 because the senior water rights belong not to the irrigators, but to the Tribes.
Concern over the fate of the listed fish surfaced again when PacifiCorp, a regional utility,
sought to relicense the dams in its Klamath Project. Federal fish agencies, which have
mandatory conditioning authority under the Federal Power Act, prescribed expensive fish
passage measures that the utility thought made the dams uneconomical to relicense. There
followed a long series of negotiations and several plans to remove the dams and revise water
management in the basin. The latter fell through when Congress was unwilling to fund
it, but the former—the dam removal plan—has been endorsed by federal and state
agencies, the utility, and several Indigenous Tribes. In 2022, the largest dam removal in
world history seems about to begin.
This article explains the Klamath, its fish, its farms, and its dams and draws some lessons
from what has long been a contentious fight over water, power, and fish. For the first time
in recent memory, projections look bright for Klamath River fish and those who depend
upon them.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
The Klamath is divided into an upper basin, lying in southern Oregon and far northern

California, and a lower basin, lying entirely in California.1 The upper basin is predominantly
arid, high desert2 that relies heavily on the Klamath Project, a federal reclamation project
authorized in 1905 pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902,3 to support its heavily
agricultural economy.4 The lack of topographic complexity in the upper watershed makes

*Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
**J.D. and Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law 2022, Lewis and Clark Law School; B.S.
Environmental Science 2014, Brown University. Law Clerk 2022–2023, Alaska Supreme Court Justice Peter J.
Maassen.
1
See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 2–4 (2012),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20120607_R42157_85310f989fd0c99aef07f0607a966a26db6d9368.pdf
[hereinafter CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT] (showing a map of the Klamath River basin and discussing
the geography of the upper basin and lower basin).
2
HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT
BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 26 (2008).
3
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 et seq.
4
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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water storage in this largely agricultural region difficult, so most of the storage capacity rests
on the shallow waters of Upper Klamath Lake.5 The lower basin, in contrast, gets most of the
region’s rainfall and is the origin of 88 percent of the Klamath River Basin’s runoff, despite
representing only about half of the basin’s land area.6
The Klamath River basin is a 12,000 square mile expanse of land running from Upper
Klamath Lake in south central Oregon’s high desert. The river crosses into California and
ultimately empties into the Pacific Ocean within the boundaries of Redwood National Park. 7
The third largest in the western United States in terms of flow,8 the river once was also the
third largest salmon producing river on the West Coast.9 But the damming of the river,
beginning in 1908, disrupted salmonid migration, and the Iron Gate Dam now blocks all
upstream fish passage just below the California border.10 But the lower Klamath River
remains one of the longest undammed rivers in California,11 at 286 miles.12 In 1981, the
Secretary of the Interior designated the lower Klamath River a national wild and scenic river. 13
In 1988, the voters of Oregon also designated 11 miles of the upper Klamath River in Oregon
as a state scenic river, which the Secretary of the Interior later added to the national system
in 1994.14
5

DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 25.
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
7
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 23.
8
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
9
Klamath River Renewal Project, KLAMATH RIVER RENEWAL CORPORATION, https://klamathrenewal.org/theproject/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
10
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 31. See also CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
11
Id. at 34.
12
Klamath National Wild & Scenic River, U.S. FOREST SERVICE,
https://www.fs.usda.gov/recarea/klamath/recarea/?recid=13066#:~:text=The%20Klamath%20River%20is
%20a,to%20navigate%20on%20their%20own (last visited Dec. 2, 2021).
13
Approval for Inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System as State Administered Components,
46 Fed. Reg. 7,484 (Jan. 23, 1981).
14
Upper Klamath Wild and Scenic River, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/national-conservation-lands/oregon-washington/upper-klamath6
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One consequence of the development of the Klamath has been the addition of several
species of cultural significance to the Klamath tribes to the federal endangered species list.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) listed the Southern Oregon/Northern California
Coast population of coho salmon in the lower basin as threatened under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) in 1997.15 Among the factors contributing to the decline of the coho and
the need for the listing, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) cited declines in water
quality, altered streamflows, and fish passage impediments.16 According to NMFS, the major
activities responsible for the decline of coho salmon in Oregon and California included dams,
water withdrawals, and unscreened diversions for irrigation.17
A decade earlier, in 1988, FWS listed the shortnose sucker and the Lost River sucker
in Upper Klamath Lake as endangered.18 Both species have historically served as major food
sources for the Klamath Tribes of the upper basin.19 FWS found the primary factors behind
the widespread decline of the suckers to include “damming of rivers, instream flow diversion,
draining of marshes, dredging of Upper Klamath Lake and other forms of water
manipulation,” with dams being “particularly destructive.”20 This conflict between the
Klamath River as a healthy habitat for native species, especially those culturally important to
the Indigenous peoples of the region, and the river as a resource for agriculture, irrigation,
and power has generated decades of strife throughout the basin.

wsr#:~:text=1988%3A%20The%20state%20of%20Oregon,Wild%20and%20Scenic%20Rivers%20Act. (last
visited March 16, 2022).
15
Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of
Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588 (1997).
16
Id. at 24,592.
17
Id.
18
Determination of Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130
(1988).
19
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, LOST RIVER & SHORTNOSE SUCKER (DELTISTES LLUXATUS & CHASMISTES
BREVIROSTRIS) (August 2010), https://www.fws.gov/klamathfallsfwo/es/factsheet/LRSN-Sucker2010.pdf.
20
Id.
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The epitome of the management complexity of Klamath Basin water was a recent
decision of federal District Court Judge Michael McShane, who in May 2021 declined to issue
an injunction requiring the Bureau of Reclamation to reduce flow releases from Klamath Lake
to aid endangered sucker fish in, the lake at the request of the Klamath Tribes, because it
would harm downstream threatened coho salmon central to the culture and diet of the Yurok
and Karuk Tribes.21 In his decision, Judge McShane noted that the drought that had raised
the Klamath Tribes’ concerns was beyond the federal Bureau’s control, so the agency could
not be held responsible for the unprecedented environmental conditions.22
The Klamath Hydroelectric Project (KHP), composed of several non-federal
hydroelectric dams, is regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
under the Federal Power Act (FPA).23 The licensee, PacifiCorp, faced with an impending
2006 expiration of its license for the project, decided it was too expensive to proceed with
relicensing.24 This decision was due in part to the FPA’s relicensing requirements and the
public attention focused on Klamath salmon in the wake of the 2001–2002 conflict. In 2005,
PacifiCorp entered multi-party negotiations to devise a solution for the Klamath, its fish, and
its people.25 Five years later, in 2010, 48 parties, including PacifiCorp, Oregon, California,
various federal agencies, the Karuk Tribe, the Klamath Tribes, the Yurok Tribe, and
irrigation, conservation, and fishing groups executed the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement

21

Judge nixes reduced Klamath River flows for sucker fish, E&E NEWS GREENWIRE (May 10, 2021),
https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1063732107.
22
Id.
23
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a–828c (2018).
24
Water Education Foundation, Klamath River Basin Chronology,
https://www.watereducation.org/aquapedia/klamath-river-basin-chronology (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
25
Id.
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Agreement (KHSA).26 The KHSA established a process for the removal of the project’s four
hydroelectric dams. This agreement, amended in 2016,27 called for the project license to be
transferred to the Klamath River Renewal Corporation (KRRC), a private, independent
nonprofit organization, to manage the removal of the dams and the restoration of the Klamath
River ecosystem.28 On June 17, 2021, the parties to the agreement succeeded in obtaining
approval from FERC to transfer the license.29 But KRRC must still get FERC’s approval to
decommission and remove the dams under FERC’s license surrender procedures.30 Thus,
fifteen years after the agreement to remove the dams, their fate remains in limbo.
This article examines the Klamath Basin conflict, its complex legal context, and its
future. Section I introduces the river and its people. Section II is a brief history of the
damming of the basin and the agricultural transformation that occurred in the early 20 th
century. Section III explains the ESA listings that the basin’s development produced, and the
resulting conflict between salmon science and the irrigation claims of local farmers and
ranchers. Section IV discusses a critical turning point in the public conversation around the

26

Joint Application for Approval of License Transfer and Request for Expedited Review and Other Relief,
Project No. 14803 (Jan. 13, 2021), https://klamathrenewal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/21_0113-JointApplication-for-Approval-of-License-Transfer-and-Request-for-Expedited-Review-and-Other-Relief.pdf.
27
The original agreement required congressional authorization to be implemented in full. PACIFICORP,
KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 7 (2018),
https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/hydro/klamathriver/khsa-implementation/implementation-plans/2018-KHSA_ImpRptF_8-24-18.pdf. But as discussed
further infra Part VI, multiple attempts to pass bills authorizing the agreement failed. See id. at 11 (discussing
the failure of a bill authorizing the agreement following renewed conflicts in the Klamath Basin and opposition
from members of Congress and local representatives); see also Daniel McCool, Integrated Water Resources
Management and Collaboration: The Failure of the Klamath River Agreements, 30 J. POLICY HISTORY 83, 99
(2018) (discussing the defeat of a second bill authorizing the agreement which was then defeated following
opposition led by Oregon Republican Congressman Greg Walden). The amended agreement eliminated the
need for federal legislation and instead planned to achieve dam removal through the FERC license transfer
and surrender process. See discussion notes 286–291 and accompanying text.
28
Id.
29
Order Approving Transfer of License, Project Nos. 2082-062, 14803-000, 14803-004, 175 FERC ¶ 61,236 at P. 46
(June 17, 2021) [hereinafter June 2021 Transfer Order]
30
Id.
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Klamath basin: the salmon kill of 2002 and its aftermath. Sections V–VII turn to the article’s
centerpiece: the plan to remove the four PacifiCorp hydroelectric dams and the prospects for
meeting a scheduled removal in 2023. We conclude that the Klamath conflict, and the
prospects for the world’s largest dam removal, hold important lessons for other river basins
and other tribes, including highlighting potential conflicts between science and democracy in
river restoration.
II.

THE RIVER AND ITS PEOPLE
The Klamath River is the third largest river draining into the Pacific Ocean south of

Canada.31 The lower Klamath once supported salmon runs of more than one million fish,
making it the third largest salmon run on the West Coast.32 But in recent years, the Klamath’s
salmon run has dropped to fewer than 30,000 fish, with no recovery in sight due to prolonged
threats from drought and disease.33
Prior to European settlement, the indigenous peoples inhabiting the Lower Basin
enjoyed million-pound annual harvests of coho and chinook salmon prior to European
settlement, while the Klamath Tribes of the Upper Basin relied upon Koptu and C’waam (Lost
River and shortnose suckers) in Klamath Lake as major food sources. 34 According to the
Klamath Tribes,35 the first white settler stepped foot on their upper basin land in 1826. 36

31

Klamath River, WESTERN RIVERS CONSERVANCY, https://www.westernrivers.org/discover/river-of-themonth/klamath-river (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
32
McCool, supra note 27, at 84.
33
Id.
34
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 27, 30; see also Klamath Tribes History, THE KLAMATH TRIBES,
https://klamathtribes.org/restoring-fish-and-a-dying-lake/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
35
“Klamath Tribes” refers collectively to three distinct tribal groups that have occupied the Upper Basin since
time immemorial: the Klamath, the Modoc, and the Yahooskin-Paiute. https://klamathtribes.org/history/.
See also CRS Report, supra note 8, at 8, explaining that the “’Klamath Tribe’ is actually composed of three
historically distinct tribal groups,” but that it was common for the United States to “make a treaty with ‘one’
tribe, which actually consisted of a combination of several tribes that were historically distinct.”
36
KLAMATH TRIBES, https://klamathtribes.org/history/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
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Hostilities between the tribes and the settlers ensued, and eventually, in 1864, the Klamath
Tribes of the upper basin ceded 23 million acres of their land in a treaty with the United
States.37 That treaty reserved approximately 1.5 million acres for the tribes, as well as hunting,
fishing, gathering, and water rights.38 The lower basin tribes (the Yurok, Hoopa Valley,
Karuk, Quartz Valley, and Resighini Rancheria),39 on the other hand, never secured treaty
rights. Instead, President Franklin Pierce created the Yurok Reservation by executive order
in 1855.40 President Grant created the Hoopa Valley Reservation in 1877, also by executive
order.41 Both orders reserved the tribes’ hunting and fishing rights, and the Ninth Circuit has
held that these rights are no less legitimate for having been reserved in executive orders, rather
than treaties.42 The Karuk, in contrast, never got their own reservation, and instead today
occupy scattered parcels of trust lands.43 Consequently, the Karuk Tribe’s hunting and fishing
rights are less certain.44 Of the five lower basin tribes, this paper focuses on the three tribes
that signed the Klamath agreements: the Klamath Tribes, the Karuk, and the Yurok.45

37

Id.
Id.
39
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
40
Formation of Reservations, THE YUROK TRIBE, https://www.yuroktribe.org/formation-of-reservations (last
visited Oct. 5, 2021). The Yurok Reservation includes the Resighini Rancheria. Final Environmental Impact
Statement for Hydropower License, Klamath Hydroelectric Project FERC Project No. 2082-027, at 3-543
(November 2007).
41
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 67.
42
Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1995).
43
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 67. The Quartz Valley Indian Reservation was first established in
1938 by proclamation of the Secretary of the Interior as the Shasta and Upper Klamath Indian Reservation.
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Hydropower License, Klamath Hydroelectric Project FERC
Project No. 2082-027, at 3-543 (November 2007). The proclamation did not reserve fishing rights for the tribe.
3 Fed. Reg. 1427 (1938).
44
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 75.
45
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. The Quartz Valley and Resighini Rancheria were
not included in negotiations, as their interests in the Klamath fisheries was deemed insufficient. Id. at n. 44.
The Hoopa Valley Tribe was included in the negotiations but opposed the original 2010 agreements because
the Tribe felt the provisions of the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement, discussed infra Part VII, might
interfere with the United States’ duty to assert and protect tribal fishery rights by subordinating the Tribe’s
priority water rights to the junior water rights of the Klamath Reclamation Project. Id. The Tribe was also
concerned that the terms of the agreements would not provide enough water to support fish populations in the
38
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By the 1950s, the Klamath Tribes were among the strongest and most prosperous tribal
nations in the U.S.46 They were the only tribes in the United States at the time to pay for all
the federal, state, and private services used by their members.47 This ability to pay was due in
part to their wealth of natural resources, including the largest ponderosa pine forests in the
western United States, and “an eagerness to turn new economic opportunities to [the Tribes’]
advantage,” including freighting and ranching.48 In spite of the tribes’ wealth and stability—
or perhaps because of it—and despite the rights reserved by the tribes in their 1864 treaty with
the United States, Congress terminated their federal recognition in 1954 in the Klamath
Termination Act.49 As a result, the federal government ceased providing human services to
the tribe, disestablished the Klamath reservation, deprived tribe members of their legal status
as Indians, and authorized for sale the tribes’ timber resources.50 The federal government gave
tribal members the “Hobson’s choice” of either selling their interests— thus terminating their
tribal membership—or maintaining their interests, but having them held not by a federal
administrative trustee, but instead by a Portland bank.51 The majority of the tribal members

lower Klamath basin, and believed that the agreements would delay dam removal. Ryan Burns, A Fight
Between Humboldt Stakeholders Over the Klamath Dams is Impacting Environmental Protections Across the Country,
LOST COAST OUTPOST, https://lostcoastoutpost.com/2019/jun/12/klamath-ruling-environmental-impacts/
(June 12, 2019 12:16 PM). As to the amended KHSA, the Tribe remains concerned about the cap the
agreement places on PacifiCorp customer, state, and federal contributions to dam removal costs. Dylan
Brown, Hoopa Valley Tribe wins lawsuit against aging Klamath River dams and Pacificorp, ABC,
https://krcrtv.com/north-coast-news/eureka-local-news/hoopa-valley-tribe-wins-lawsuit-against-agingklamath-river-dams-and-pacifico (Jan. 25, 2019). The Tribe would prefer that FERC proceed with relicensing
the dams, as they believe that any new license would require PacifiCorp to provide for fish passage, and that
the only way to achieve that would be to remove the dams. Burns, supra.
46
KLAMATH TRIBES, supra note 36.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Klamath Indians Termination of Federal Supervision, Pub L. No. 587-732, 68 Stat. 718 (1954).
50
See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 64.
51
See id. at 64–65.
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sold their interests, and ten years later the unsold land was acquired by the United States and
became part of the Fremont-Winema National Forest.52
In 1986, following decades of tribes across the country organizing to reassert their
quasi-sovereign status, the Klamath Tribes regained their federal recognition, but they did not
regain any of their reservation land.53 Despite this victory, the Klamath Tribes claim they have
struggled to regain “the loss of cultural and spiritual identity and economic self-sufficiency”
caused by “the devastating legacy of termination.”54 Central to the tribes’ efforts is the
restoration of healthy C’waam and Koptu fish populations.55 Once harvested by the thousands
as a mainstay of the Klamath Tribes’ diet, today the tribes’ annual harvest is limited to just
two fish for ceremonial purposes,56 as chronically low water levels and low water quality
brought on by drought and unsustainable agricultural and irrigation practices have led the fish
to the federal endangered species list.57 Restoring and supporting a sustainable C’Waam and
Koptu fishery is now “a cornerstone” of the Klamath Tribes’ plan to restore their economic
self-sufficiency.58
In contrast, the various species of salmon, particularly the chinook and coho, below
the Klamath dams in the lower basin are inextricably connected with the history, culture, and
survival of the lower Klamath tribes.59 These tribes have fished the Klamath River since time
immemorial.60 As recently as the late 1980s, they enjoyed a significant commercial fishing

52

See id. at 65.
See id.; see also KLAMATH TRIBES, supra note 36.
54
KLAMATH TRIBES, supra note 34.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Sucker ESA Listing, supra note 18; see also KLAMATH TRIBES, supra note 36.
58
KLAMATH TRIBES, supra note 36.
59
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
60
Brook Thompson, The familial bond between the Klamath River and the Yurok people, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS 15,
20–21 (Sept. 2021).
53
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industry.61 Salmon are also deeply culturally and spiritually important to the lower Klamath
tribes, providing a connection to ancestors and ceremonies rooted in ancient times, such as
the First Salmon Ceremony, with which tribes in the Klamath Basin honor the salmon for the
coming year.62
But like the Klamath Tribes of the upper basin, the Yurok, Karuk, and other lower
basin tribes have suffered immensely from the effects of dams and poor water management.63
For example, the construction of the Klamath dams in 1911 and 1962 coincided with the
emergence of diabetes in the Karuk Tribe,64 and by 2005 the incidence of diabetes among the
Karuk people was 21 percent— nearly four times the U.S. average— and the estimated rate
of heart disease was 39.6 percent— three times the U.S. average.65 This calamity was due in
large part to the loss of access to traditional foods, particularly salmon.66 Perhaps as important
for the Karuk people, “[t]he act of eating salmon from the Klamath River affirms sense of
place, identity, connection, and community,”67 and the loss of that tradition can be
devastating. The Yurok people likewise have suffered physically and emotionally from the
loss of the traditional salmon diet,68 with the tribe declaring a “state of emergency for tribal
mental health” in 2016, due in part, as one Yurok tribal member put it, to “[t]he loss of our

61

CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–6.
Thompson, supra note 60, at 20.
63
Id. at 20–21.
64
Id. at 20.
65
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, KLAMATH FACILITIES REMOVAL FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 3.12-28, https://kbifrm.psmfc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/2012_0246_Klamath-Facilities-Dam-Removal-Final-EIS.pdf [hereinafter
KLAMATH FACILITIES REMOVAL FEIS/EIR].
66
See id. at 3.12-25 (discussing the effects on tribal health from having “fewer available fish” as a result of dam
operations, making tribal members “likely to consume less of the traditional food base and pay less attention to
the culturally inherited management traditions of a ‘Salmon People’”).
67
Id. at 3.12-28.
68
Id. at 3.12-43.
62

11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4061159

fish.”69 Once the wealthiest people in what became California, the Karuk, Yurok, and Hoopa
Tribes are now among the poorest.70
Changes to the flow and quality of the Klamath itself as a result of the dams have also
been devastating to the culture, traditions, spirituality, and sense of self of the various
Klamath tribes. The Yurok, for example, “base time and direction on the flows of the Klamath
River.”71 According to one Yurok elder during tribal consultation over the proposed removal
of the Klamath dams, “Without this river we would not know who we are, where we’re from,
or where we’re going.”72 Etchings in rocks along the Klamath River provide instructions
directly from the Creator to the Yurok people, including one “warning that when the rivers
stop flowing that will mark the end of the Yurok world.”73 For other tribes, such as the
Klamath Tribes in the upper basin and the Karuk, ritual bathing in the river has been disrupted
by the effects of dams on water quality.74
Ocean fishermen have also suffered greatly from the loss of healthy fish populations
in the Klamath Basin. As anadromous fish, salmon are born in freshwater, migrate to the
ocean to mature, and return to freshwater to spawn.75 Disruption at any point in this life cycle
within the basin, even for one generation, can therefore have devastating effects on the ocean

69

Thompson, supra note 60, at 21.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 65, at 3.12-29.
71
Id., supra note 65, at 3.12-40.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 3.12-42.
74
See id. at 3.12-11 (“[T]he water of the Klamath River is widely viewed as inappropriate” for ritual uses by the
Klamath Tribes “because of the effects of the dams on water temperature, algae development, and other
variables of water quality.”) and 3.12-26 (describing how “[d]egraded water quality in the Klamath Basin . . .
has impaired the ability of Karuk to use the water for cultural purposes,” including ceremonial bathing and
cultural ceremonies traditionally involving the ingestion of river water).
75
Salmon of the West, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
https://www.fws.gov/salmonofthewest/salmon.htm#:~:text=Salmon%20are%20anadromous%2C%20meani
ng%20they,to%20spawn%20a%20new%20generation.&text=Salmon%20may%20travel%203%2C000%20mile
s,the%20ocean%20leg%20of%20migration (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).
70
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fishery for years afterward.76 For example, following the 2002 Klamath River fish kill,
discussed further in Part IV below, continuing population effects from the kill four years later
led NMFS to severely restrict ocean fishing for salmon due to low numbers of naturally
spawning adults in the region.77 West Coast commercial fishermen endured 700 miles of
emergency ocean salmon fishery closures in 2006 and mass unemployment in the salmon
fleet.78 As Glen Spain, Northwest Regional Director for the Pacific Coast Federation of
Fishermen’s Associations, described it: “Ghosts of those lost fish lingered as subsequent
generations of salmon dwindled, the years of missing spawners taking their toll”79 and
haunting the fishing community for years.80
Pacific coast commercial fishermen have therefore often found themselves allied with
the tribes, conservation groups, and others in the fight to restore natural flows and improve
water quality in the Klamath Basin.81 Restoring fish populations in the basin would revive
ocean fisheries from Florence, Oregon to Fort Bragg, California, where coastal communities
have seen their salmon harvest nearly disappear.82
In addition to the damming of the Klamath, the basin has been transformed by
agricultural development and the settlement of a politically powerful irrigation community,
particularly in the upper basin, despite the region’s severe climatic conditions which make it

76

See Glen H. Spain, Fishermen Join Tribes, Conservation Groups, to Protect Klamath River Salmon, EARTHJUSTICE
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://earthjustice.org/blog/2017-february/fishermen-join-tribes-conservation-groups-toprotect-klamath-river-salmon (stating, following a dramatic loss of juvenile salmon from a parasite in 2014 and
2015, that “[t]he impact of two years of heavy juvenile mortality will be felt for years, as fewer young fish
mean fewer adult spawners two to three years in the future”).
77
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
78
See Spain, supra note 76.
79
See id.
80
Id.
81
See id.
82
Alex Schwartz, Politicians to PacifiCorp: Get a Move-On with Dam Removal, HERALD & NEWS (Aug. 19, 2020)
https://www.heraldandnews.com/news/local_news/environment/politicians-to-pacificorp-get-a-move-onwith-dam-removal/article_1dcacb42-9356-53b6-9770-71cec6f6f7f0.html.
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relatively unproductive.83 Under Oregon law, irrigators can acquire property rights in water, 84
facilitating the extensive farming of crops such as wheat, malt barley, potatoes, onions, and
alfalfa.85 Although irrigation projects, subsidized water deliveries, and Oregon water law
make farming possible in the upper basin, the region’s harsh and arid climate prevents it from
being particularly profitable.86 But for many farmers in the upper basin, the economic
unviability of farming in the region is not relevant, as many “view farming not as a business
but as a way of life.”87 The resolve of these farmers is likely to be tested in the near future,
however, as the security of irrigation water rights was recently undermined by a Federal
Circuit decision making clear that irrigators’ rights are junior to the senior rights of the
Klamath Tribes.88 How much change will result in water flows following this decision is not
yet clear.
III.

THE DAMS: TRANSFORMING THE KLAMATH BASIN
Today, the upper basin of the Klamath River is hardly recognizable as the river that

supported the various tribes of indigenous peoples since time immemorial, due to the dams,
irrigation projects, and other water diversions that now obstruct the river’s natural flow. Four
of these dams are hydroelectric dams owned and operated by PacifiCorp, an investor-owned
utility,89 and are the focus of this article. Those dams are JC Boyle, Copco No. 1 and No. 2,

83

See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that none of the lands in the Upper Basin fall in the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s highest productivity class).
84
Baley v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 642 n. 12 (2017).
85
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
86
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 29.
87
Id. at 29.
88
Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 679 (“The fact is that the Tribes’ reserved water rights are senior to the water rights
held by the [irrigator] plaintiffs and, therefore, plaintiffs had no entitlement to receive any water until the
Tribes’ senior rights were fully satisfied.”); see also infra notes 200–217 and accompanying text.
89
CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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and Iron Gate.90 Together, these four hydroelectric dams, along with a fifth dam that
generates no electricity, but regulates water levels in Keno Reservoir, and three related
hydroelectric developments, make up the Klamath Hydroelectric Project (KHP). 91
Siskiyou Electric Power and Light first envisioned the project in 1911 as part of a plan
for the long-term development of the Klamath River.92 Just six years after the Secretary of the
Interior’s 1905 authorization of the Klamath Project—a reclamation project to store water,
divert water for irrigation, and control flooding—the hydroelectric project was part of a long
period of practically unbridled expansion of settlement in the Klamath Basin, beginning with
the discovery of gold in the lower Klamath around 1850.93 The first dam on the mainstem of
the river, Copco 1, became operational in 1918, cutting off salmon runs to the Upper Klamath
Basin.94 The next mainstem dams followed in 1925 (Copco 2), 1958 (J.C. Doyle Dam), and
1962 (Iron Gate Dam).95
Federally owned reclamation dams are distinct from the dams of the Project in that
they are primarily water projects to irrigate arid western lands, although many were equipped
to provide hydroelectric power as well.96 The 1902 Reclamation Act97 authorized the
construction of these dams, and became the pillar of federal subsidization of western

90

Klamath River Renewal Corporation, The Project, https://klamathrenewal.org/the-project/ (last visited Dec.
30, 2021).
91
Pacificorp, Klamath River, https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/hydro/klamath-river.html (last visited Dec.
30, 2021).
92
Klamath Hydroelectric Project Request for Determination of Eligibility, PACIFICORP 27 (Oct. 2003),
https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/hydro/klamathriver/relicensing/klamath-final-licenseapplication/Exhibit_E_Appendices_E_6E_Request_for_Determination_of_Eligibility_Text.pdf
93
See Klamath River Basin Chronology, WATER EDUCATION FOUNDATION,
https://www.watereducation.org/aquapedia/klamath-river-basin-chronology (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 41.02 (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3rd ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender
2022).
97
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 et seq.
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development, enabling the expansion of non-native colonization into arid western regions
that previously could never have supported the resource intensive lifestyles of the settlers and
their cattle.98
Non-federal hydroelectric dams are regulated under the terms of the FPA.99 The 1920
FPA assigned the licensing and regulation of hydroelectric dams under the authority of a
designated multi-officer agency, as opposed to the previous pattern of Congress individually
authorizing each project.100 The impetus for reform came from the Progressive Conservation
movement of the early twentieth century, when well-known figures such as Theodore
Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot “decried congressional authorization of hydroelectric projects
as haphazard and dependent on pork barrel politics.”101 The Progressives got their way to
some extent with the passage of the FPA in 1920, but the FPA was a compromise between
the conservationists and private power interests—balancing regulation of private
hydroelectric projects, while promoting development by granting licenses for up to 50-year
terms.102 The term-limited licenses ensured that at some point during the life of the dam, its
utility as a power generator, and its effect on the ecology and other public uses of rivers would
periodically be subject to review.103

98

See Waters and Water Rights, supra note 96, § 41.02 (discussing the impossibilities of successful
homesteading of the arid western lands absent federal aid). Arguably many of these lands still cannot
sustainably support the agricultural and ranching practices that sustain non-Indigenous communities in the
arid west, given the ecological and social tragedies wrought upon this region and its Indigenous inhabitants, as
discussed throughout this paper.
99
FPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–825u (2018).
100
See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 96, § 40.02.
101
See id.
102
16 U.S.C. §§ 799, 808(e). Such lengthy licensing terms allow developers time and security to attract
investment capital. See H.R. Rep. No. 66-61, at 5 (1919) (statement of David F. Houston, Sec’y of Agriculture,
stating that the House Bill was to provide “a method by which the water powers of the country, wherever
located, can be developed by public or private agencies under conditions that will give the necessary security to
the capital invested and at the same time protect and preserve every legitimate public interest”).
103
See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 96, at § 40.02.
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A cornerstone of the FPA was the consolidation of federal jurisdiction over
hydroelectric development in a single commission of five commissioners appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms of five years. 104 Once known
as the Federal Power Commission, today that commission is the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).105 The FPA requires FERC to ensure that nonfederal hydroelectric
projects:
will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or
waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and
utilization of water-power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and
enhancement of fish and wildlife (including spawning grounds and habitat), and for other
beneficial public uses, including irrigation, flood control, water supply, and recreational . . .
purposes.106

Although FERC maintains primary responsibility for administering the FPA, several
of its provisions grant mandatory license conditioning authority to other federal
agencies.107 In addition, other federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water
Act (CWA)108 and Endangered Species Act (ESA),109 provide a role for other federal
and state agencies in the hydroelectric project licensing process. Under these statutes,
various federal and state agencies may impose license conditions; FERC is required to
either adopt these conditions, or reject the license altogether.110 Because so many
hydroelectric dams were constructed prior to the enactment of most significant and

104

16 U.S.C. § 792.
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 96, at § 40.01; Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 301, 401–407, 91 Stat. 565, 578, 582–87 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7151, 7171–
7177).
106
16 U.S.C. § 803.
107
See Part V, infra.
108
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2018).
109
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018).
110
Escondido Mutual Water Company v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 778 (1984).
105
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relevant environmental statutes other than the FPA,111 the relicensing process is the
focus of much attention and controversy before FERC.112 Relicensing is the first
opportunity in many years for Indian tribes, other state and federal agencies, and the
public to have a say in licensing conditions— or whether the dam at issue should be
relicensed at all.113
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a jolt to a growing movement to
decommission dams around the country that had begun in the 1980s. 114 This
movement was spawned in part by an increasing understanding of the many
ecological, social, and economic harms wrought by dams,115 but perhaps more
significantly, by the emergence of the FPA’s conditioning authorities as a tool for
ecological management.116 Whatever benefits a dam may provide, or may have
provided at one time in its lifespan, they come at high environmental costs, including

111

For example, there are twenty-one dams currently licensed under active FERC licenses issued before the
enactment of the Endangered Species Act in 1973 or the Clean Water Act in 1972. Complete List of Active
Licenses, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/licensing (follow “Complete list of Active Licenses” hyperlink) (last
visited Jan. 7, 2022; spreadsheet as of this writing on file with author). Note that this count does not include
any dams that were initially licensed prior to 1973, but have since been relicensed. When a license expires,
FERC has four options: “(1) relicense the project to the current licensee; (2) grant a license to another licensee;
(3) grant a nonpower license; or (4) recommend federal takeover.” 2 Water and Water Rights § 40.09(a.01).
112
See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 96, at § 40.09(a.01) (“Between 2000 and 2010, the original
licenses of approximately 220 hydropower projects, representing almost one-third of the hydropower capacity
licensed by FERC, expired. As a result of the need for these projects to obtain new licenses, the relicensing
process has become the focus of a great deal of attention at FERC.”).
113
Although the conditioning authority is limited to government agencies, the public has other opportunities to
participate, such as the notice and comment process during the National Environmental Policy Act review.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C), 4332(2)(E) (2018).
114
See David H. Becker, The challenges of dam removal: the history and lessons of the Condit Dam and potential threats
from the 2005 Federal Power Act amendments, 36 ENV’T LAW 811, 812–13 (2006).
115
See GEORGE C. COGGINS, ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 646 (7th ed. 2014); see also
Michael C. Blumm & Andrew B. Erickson, Dam Removal in the Pacific Northwest: Lessons for the Nation, 42
ENV’T L. 1043, 1045 (2012) (discussing the effect of dams on anadromous fish, leading to calls to remove dams
to restore salmon populations).
116
See Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in
Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUMBIA J. ENV’T L. 81, 83–84 (2001) (noting a series of court decisions beginning
in the 1980s that “ma[d]e clear that federal land managers, federal fishery agencies, and state water quality
agencies have important roles to play in relicensing hydroelectric projects, and that FERC must accept their
license conditions even if it disagrees with the terms”).
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blocking passage of anadromous fish when they return from the ocean to spawn in
freshwater streams,117 decreasing downstream water quality,118 and reducing river
flows,119 high human health and safety costs,120 economic costs, particularly to
recreation and tourism industries,121 and cultural costs for Indigenous peoples.122
In the 1980s, the courts began to recognize the FPA’s delegations of authority
to federal land managers and federal fishery agencies, enabling them to impose
mandatory conditions on hydroelectric project licenses, which in turn made dam
removal a viable way to respond to the harms that dams cause.123 In the face of
economically and administratively costly licensing conditions requiring licensees to
retrofit older dams with fish ladders and other tools to encourage fish passage, some
licensees were now incentivized to instead remove their dams.124
Between 2000 and 2010, approximately 220 hydropower projects came up for
relicensing.125 Inspired by the success of the removal of the Edwards Dam from

117

See Blumm & Erickson, supra note 115, at 1045.
KLAMATH FACILITIES REMOVAL FEIS/EIR, supra note 65, at 1-3.
119
Id. at 1-9.
120
The 2007 FEIS prepared for the removal of the Klamath dams, for example, noted methylmercury
concentrations in the tissue of fish caught the Iron Gate and Copco reservoirs above the U.S. EPA criterion for
consumers of noncommercial freshwater fish. Id. at 3.2-35. Methylmercury is a neurotoxin with demonstrated
adverse effects on “fetal growth, neurologic function, the cardio-vascular system, and immune function.”
Margaret R. Karagas et al., Evidence on the Human Health Effects of Low-Level Methylmercury Exposure, 120 ENV’T
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 799 (2012). As the toxin bioaccumulates in fish tissue, it poses a particular risk to
Indigenous people for whom fish is an important part of their diet and culture. See, e.g. Ryan S. D. Calder et
al., Future Impacts of Hydroelectric Power Development on Methylmercury Exposures of Canadian Indigenous
Communities, 50 Env’t Sci. Technol. 13115 (2016) (discussing harms to “Canadian indigenous communities
previously impacted by hydroelectric flooding” from methylmercury exposure).
121
The removal of the Condit Dam on the White Salmon River, for example, made the area a destination spot
for whitewater kayakers and boaters and recreational fishers. Condit Dam, AMERICAN RIVERS,
https://www.americanrivers.org/condit-dam/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2021).
122
The damming of the Columbia River, for example, destroyed entire Native villages and traditional and
historic treaty-guaranteed fishing rights. The Impact of Dams: Celilo Falls Case Study, SMITHSONIAN NATIONAL
MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, https://americanindian.si.edu/nk360/pnw-history-culturebarriers/dams.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2021).
123
Blumm & Nadol, supra note 116, at 84; see also discussion infra, Part V.
124
Id. at 84.
125
2 Waters and Water Rights, supra note 96, § 40.09.
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Maine’s Kennebec River in 1999, and recognizing the potential benefits of dam
removal, advocates for removal began to focus on the FERC relicensing process and
various regulatory handles that can be harnessed to achieve removal, such as the ESA
and CWA.126 But dam removal and habitat restoration is not simple. It can mobilize
the massive volumes of sediment that have accumulated behind the dam over the
decades.127 These sediments can contain toxic substances such as heavy metals, PCBs,
asbestos, and other harmful substances.128 Structures that have been built in the river’s
natural floodplain, during the period where the dam disrupted the river’s natural flow,
may need to be modified, removed, or relocated to prepare for the dam’s removal, and
other features once flooded may again become exposed and require mitigation, such
as forgotten waterfalls and smaller dams.129 In many instances, however, the “dramatic
ecological and associated economic benefits”130 of dam removal significantly outweigh
the costs.131
IV.

THE ESA LISTINGS
Freshwater fish are the most imperiled vertebrate group in the United States, with 140

species currently listed under the ESA.132 An additional 43 marine fish species, including
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GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 646 (Robert C. Clark et al.,
eds., 7th ed. 2014).
127
Id. at 647.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
See, e.g., David H. Becker, The challenges of dam removal: the history and lessons of the Condit Dam and potential
threats from the 2005 Federal Power Act amendments, 36 ENV’T LAW 811, 812–13 (2006); see also Blumm &
Erickson, supra note 115, at 1046 (discussing how FERC’s policy statement concluding that the agency has
authority to order removal of dams at the dam owner’s expense recognized “that in some cases the balance of
environmental and economic considerations tipped in favor of removing dams”).
132
FWS-Listed U.S. Species by Taxonomic Group – Fishes, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/species-listings-by-tax-group?statusCategory=Listed&groupName=Fishes
(last visited Nov. 28, 2021). For comparison, the next most imperiled vertebrate group is birds, with 106
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anadromous fish that spend part of their life cycle in marine environments, are listed as well.133
Both the lower basin’s Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast population of coho
salmon (“SONCC coho salmon”)134 and the upper basin’s two species of suckers135 are among
these listed fish.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Lost River and shortnose suckers as
endangered species in 1988.136 Although sufficiently plentiful to support a major sport fishery
as recently as the 1960s and 1970s, by 1987 the Klamath Tribes and local state and federal
biologists had become “so alarmed by the population decline of both suckers”137 that the
Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission closed the fishery for both species and listed them as
protected species.138 According to the FWS, its listing decision to list the two sucker species
as endangered was due to streamflow diversions, the draining of marshes, dredging of Upper
Klamath Lake, and other forms of water manipulation139—all factors related to the
transformation of the river to support agricultural and industrial development. The FWS
listing decision also noted that “[d]ams have been particularly destructive” as they block
spawning runs and facilitate hybridization between different types of suckers trapped below

species listed. FWS-Listed U.S. Species by Taxonomic Group – Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/species-listings-by-tax-group?statusCategory=Listed&groupName=Birds
(last visited Nov. 28, 2021).
133
ESA Threatened & Endangered, NOAA FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/speciesdirectory/threatenedendangered?title=&species_category=1000000031&species_status=any&regions=all&items_per_page=25&pa
ge=2&sort= (last visited Nov. 28, 2021).
134
Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU)
of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588 (1997).
135
Determination of Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130
(1988).
136
53 Fed. Reg. at 27,132. An “endangered species” is one that “is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range.” ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2018).
137
Proposal to Determine Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and the Lost River Sucker, 52 Fed Reg.
32,145, 32,146 (Aug. 26, 1987).
138
53 Fed. Reg. at 27,131.
139
Id. at 27,130.
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the dam.140 The listing decision also observed that the reservoirs associated with damming
“often lack long stretches of large inflowing rivers that are necessary for successful
spawning.”141 Of particular importance to the declines of the sucker fish was the construction
of the Sprague River Dam at Chiloquin, Oregon, which “probably eliminated more than 95
percent of the historical spawning habitat” for the two species.142 Although the Bureau of
Reclamation had equipped the dam with fish ladders, they were not effective, as the suckers,
while strong-swimmers, have limited leaping ability.143 The sucker fish in Upper Klamath
lake remain listed nearly two decades later.144
As is often the case when water rights for human populations conflict with protection
of imperiled wildlife, the listing of the suckers was not without controversy. In September
2001, the director of a private property rights group petitioned FWS to delist the suckers. 145
FWS found the petitions failed to demonstrate that delisting was warranted.146 But supporters
of delisting were undeterred, and on June 12, 2002, six individuals, none of whom had filed
the original petitions, sued FWS in federal court, alleging that FWS’s denial of the petitions
was arbitrary and capricious.147 The reviewing court sided with the plaintiffs, finding that
FWS’s conclusion was not supported by the administrative record.148 The Oregon district
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Id.
Id.
142
Id. at 27,131.
143
Id. at 27,132.
144
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris),
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/species/7160 (last visited March 16, 2022) (listing the shortnose sucker as presently
endangered wherever found); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Lost River Sucker (Deltistes luxatus),
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/species/5604 (last visited March 16, 2022) (listing the Lost River sucker as presently
endangered wherever found).
145
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Finding on a Petition to Delist the Lost River
Sucker (Deltistes luxatus) and the Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris), 74 Fed. Reg. 30,996, 30,997 (June
29, 2009). FWS also received three additional petitions they considered equivalent. Id.
146
Id.
147
Moden v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Or. 2003).
148
Id. at 1196.
141
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court remanded the 90-day finding to FWS “to either reissue the finding with further
explanation or proceed to a status review.”149 FWS proceeded to make a new finding,
clarifying its analysis and addressing additional comments made by the court and the
petitioners,150 but again concluding that delisting was not warranted.151
NMFS listed SONCC coho salmon as a threatened species in 1997.152 The SONCC
coho is one of six distinct population segments (DPS) of coho salmon. 153 The listing of the
SONCC coho DPS was prompted by an unfortunate confluence of environmental factors,
including drought, floods, and poor ocean conditions, the adverse effects of which were
exacerbated by human-caused impacts such as “habitat degradation, harvest, water
diversions, and artificial propagation.”154 The listing decision explained that dams, water
withdrawals, and unscreened diversions for irrigation were largely responsible for the decline
of the SONCC coho salmon.155
Of particular relevance to the issue of the damming of the Klamath River, the listing
decision observed that “[d]epletion and storage of natural flows have drastically altered

149

Id.
Notice of Revised 90-Day Petition Finding and Initiation of a 5-Year Status Review of the Lost River
Sucker and Shortnose Sucker, 69 Fed. Reg. 43,554, 43,555 (July 21, 2004).
151
Id. at 43,558. The notice of the new 90-day finding also initiated 5-year status reviews for both species. Id.
While the review for the shortnose sucker recommended that the species remain classified as endangered, id.,
the review for the Lost River sucker recommended downlisting the species from endangered to threatened.
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, LOST RIVER SUCKER (DELTISTES LUXATUS) 5-YEAR REVIEW SUMMARY
AND EVALUATION 29 (2007). FWS based this determination on evidence that populations had managed to
persist and stabilize following mortality events and because “significant habitat restoration efforts have been
completed and are planned for the future.” Id. Nevertheless, today both species are listed as endangered: the
petitions at issue had “sought only complete delisting,” so FWS considered only whether both species should
be delisted and concluded that such an action was not warranted. 74 Fed. Reg. at 30,998. Although FWS
announced its intent to propose a rule to down-list the Lost River sucker, the agency does not seem to have
followed through. Id. at 30,999.
152
62 Fed. Reg. 24,588. “Threatened” in the context of the ESA “means any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all of a significant portion of its range.” ESA,
16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2018).
153
Id.
154
62 Fed. Reg. at 24,592.
155
Id.
150
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natural hydrological cycles, especially in California and southern Oregon rivers and
streams.”156 The adverse effects of this flow alteration included migration delay, stranding of
fish as a result of rapid flow fluctuations, the trapping of juveniles in diversion screens, and
increased juvenile mortality from hotter water temperatures.157 The listing decision also noted
the sorry state of waterbodies in northern California and southern Oregon: at the time of
listing, only 706 stream miles of the 6,086 stream miles (about 11%) assessed by the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality met all state water quality standards; 158 in California,
eight waterbodies within the range of the SONCC coho DPS had been designated as impaired
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).159
Like the listing of the suckers, the listing of the SONCC coho salmon also brought
controversy. In 2001, NMFS received a petition from Interactive Citizens United to delist
coho salmon in Siskyou County, California—fish that would be part of the SONCC coho
salmon ESU.160 NMFS received a duplicate petition from the California State Grange on
March 18, 2002.161 The agency rejected both petitions because the ESA “does not authorize
the delisting of only a subset or portion of a listed species/subspecies/DPS,”162 and the
petitions failed to “present substantial scientific or commercial information to indicate that
the petitioned action may be warranted.”163 NFMS included the SONCC coho salmon ESU
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Id. at 24,593.
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. Other factors contributing to the SONCC coho salmon’s status as a threatened species included
overfishing in non-tribal fisheries, id., inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms, id. at 24,596–98, and
“long-term trends in rainfall and marine productivity,” id. at 24,598, including droughts and floods. Id. at
24,599.
160
Endangered and Threatened Species: Findings on Petitions to Delist Pacific Salmonid ESUs, 67 Fed. Reg.
6,215, 6,216 (Feb. 11, 2001).
161
67 Fed. Reg. 40,679 (June 13, 2002).
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62 Fed. Reg. at 24,599 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d)).
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Id.
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in a series of status reviews for fourteen ESUs of Pacific salmon and steelhead,164 and found
that the ESU’s listing was warranted.165
V.

THE SALMON KILL OF 2002 AND ITS AFTERMATH
The listing of the coho salmon in the lower basin, paired with the listing of the two

species of suckers in the upper basin, aggravated an already tense situation between
hydroelectric dam operators, irrigators, and the needs of the listed fish and the wildlife
agencies responsible for ensuring their survival.166 With the listing of the coho, “[w]ater
supplies for irrigators were now squeezed from both ends of the basin:”167 the coho required
minimum downstream flows, while the suckers required sufficient water retained in the upper
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Id. at 6,218.
Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed Determinations for 27 ESUs of West Coast Salmonids, 69
Fed. Reg. 33,101, 33,165 (June 14, 2004); Endangered and Threatened Species: Final Listing Determinations
for 16 ESUs of West Coast Salmon, and Final Protective Regulations for Threatened Salmonid ESUs, 70 Fed.
Reg. 37,159, 37,193 (June 28, 2005). In 2011, NMFS received three more petitions, including two from the
Siskiyou County Water Users Association (SCWUA), to delist the SONCC coho salmon. 90-Day Finding on
Petitions to Delist Coho Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 62,375 (Oct. 7, 2011).
NMFS rejected all the petitions, deciding that they included no clear administrative recommendations,
contained numerous inconsistencies and errors in the recommendations they attempted to make, lacked
detailed narrative justifications for delisting, and failed “to provide substantial scientific or commercial
information” that delisting may be warranted. Id. The petitioners renewed their request three more times, but
NMFS rejected each petition. 90-Day Finding on Petitions to Delist the Southern Oregon/Northern California
Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
1,668, 1,669 (Jan. 11, 2012); 90-Day Finding on Petitions to Delist the Southern Oregon/Northern California
Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
55,458 (Sept. 10, 2012); 90-Day Finding on Petitions to Delist the Southern Oregon/Northern California
Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
46,322, 46,323 (July 31, 2013).
166
In 1997, for example, just prior to the coho listing, Pacificorp sued BOR for its 1997 operating plan that
limited September flows through the Link River Dam, claiming the plan would violate the minimum flow
requirements of its FERC license. See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 109. After BOR and Pacificorp
renegotiated the terms of the contract for the operation of the dam, contingent on FERC’s approval, a group of
irrigators filed suit to enforce the original contract. Id. Their claims were rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which
held that BOR had the authority to operate the dam to comply with the ESA, notwithstanding the earlier
contract or the irrigators’ water rights. Klamath Water Users Assoc. v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1999).
167
Klamath Water Users Ass’n, 204 F.3d at 1213.
165
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basin.168 The struggle between NFMS, on behalf of the coho, and FWS, on behalf of the
suckers, to maintain this balance left little water for irrigators.169
The situation worsened when a dry winter in 2000–2001 led to drought conditions that
spring.170 In April 2001, FWS and NMFS each issued biological opinions (2001 BiOps)
concluding that the Bureau of Reclamation’s proposal to continue operating its irrigation
projects on the Klamath, despite low water levels and myriad water quality issues, would
jeopardize the continued existence of both the suckers and the coho.171 As a result, on April
6, 2001, Reclamation announced it would not release water to farms which normally would
receive water from Upper Klamath Lake—an announcement that would have affected an
estimated 200,000 acres of farm and pasture lands.172 The farmers and ranchers of the
Klamath Basin were, unsurprisingly, outraged, and began a loud resistance, promising to
open irrigation dam headgates by force, and threatening public officials.173
In late July, the Bush Administration, responding to the national attention now
directed at the Klamath basin and the protests of the farmers, ordered only a small amount of
additional water released from Upper Klamath Lake.174 All seemed relatively well, and so in
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Id.
Id.
170
Id.
171
See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 120; see also CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1,
at 37.
172
See CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
173
Id.
174
Id. See also Kenneth A. Rykbost & Rodney Todd, The Klamath Reclamation Project, in WATER ALLOCATION
IN THE KLAMATH RECLAMATION PROJECT, 2001: AN ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCE, ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WITH A FOCUS ON THE UPPER KLAMATH BASIN 13 (eds. William S.
Braunworth, Jr. et al. December 2002).
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the spring of 2002 the Bush Administration saw no problem in disregarding the caution urged
in the 2001 BiOps, and irrigation waters were released with little reservation for fish.175
The consequences for salmon were nothing short of disastrous: in September 2002 a
massive fish kill ensued, and more than 34,000 salmon176 wound up dead in the lower
Klamath River from a disease outbreak “triggered by crowding of the fish into the low, warm
waters of the mouth of the river.”177 Nearly all of the fish were adult anadromous salmonids,
primarily fall-run chinook salmon (97.1%), steelhead (1.8%), and coho salmon (1%). 178 The
kill was a shocking scene: as one fisheries biologist with the Yurok Tribe described it, “[e]very
few feet there’s a dead salmon, for as long as you can see.”179 Another witness remarked:
“There’s no memory of a loss of adult salmon of this magnitude before.”180 A biologist for the
Yurok Tribe helping to count the dead fish said he felt “like the Red Cross going through a
battle zone.”181 The impacts of this ecological and social nightmare would reverberate
throughout the Klamath basin for decades to come.
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See CRS KLAMATH RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 1, at 38–39; DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at
138–40. The release of irrigation waters at the expense of the fish was met with resistance: at a ceremony in
Klamath Falls celebrating the release, members of the Klamath Tribes held up signs reading “Bush Kills Fish.”
Michael Milstein & Jim Barnett, Salmon Die-Off Fears Become Harsh Reality, THE OREGONIAN A01 (Sept. 29,
2002).
176
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, KLAMATH RIVER FISH DIE-OFF: REPORT ON ESTIMATE OF MORTALITY
ii (Sept. 2002)
https://www.fws.gov/arcata/fisheries/reports/technical/Klamath_River_Dieoff_Mortality_Report_AFWO_
01_03.pdf. The report notes that this is a “conservative assessment.” Id. at 13.
177
See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 139. See also Steve Hymon, Salmon Die-Off Reignites Feud Over
Klamath River Water, L.A. TIMES 6 (Sept. 25, 2002) (noting that, at the time of writing, wildlife officials
suspected the fish died of “gill rot,” the causes of which can include “high water temperatures and too many
fish crowded together, both conditions caused by low flows”).
178
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note176, at ii.
179
Hymon, supra note 177 (quoting David Hillemeier, a fisheries biologist with the Yurok Tribe).
180
Michael Milstein, Salmon Die-Off Tied to Flaws in Klamath Policy, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 24, 2002) (quoting
Paul Wertz of the Cal. Dep’t of Fish and Game).
181
Michelle Cole, Spirit for Fishing Dies with Salmon, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 28, 2002) (quoting Greg Bates,
biologist for the Yurok Tribe).
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The devastation was particularly acute for the basin’s tribes, due to their deep ties to
the salmon and the Klamath River. Fred Simms, a member of the Yurok Tribe, described
having a “bad, bad feeling” that he had “done something wrong,” because he could have
done something more.182 Sue Masten, then-chairwoman of the Yurok Tribe, remarked on the
federal government’s broken promises to the tribes: “The government promised to protect the
resources we depend on for our very survival, and that’s not something that should be taken
lightly.”183
The controversy over water allotments and the ensuing salmon die-off dominated
news cycles, with irrigators and their political allies maintaining that the cause was disease,
not a water shortage.184 Gruesome images of the bloated bodies of thousands of dead fish
shocked and disturbed a general public that had likely given little thought to the Klamath, its
salmon, or its embattled variety of water users prior to the devastation of September 2002.
The decision to release the water for irrigation, and the ensuing fish kill, encapsulated
clashes between sound science and the power of irrigated agriculture that have long
characterized the water conflicts of the Klamath basin, and continue to do so today. A 2002
report by the National Research Council (NRC) framed the backbone of the controversy. The
Departments of the Interior and Commerce commissioned the report, tasking the NRC with
reviewing the science supporting FWS and NMFS’ 2001 BiOps.185 The NRC’s preliminary
report, released in February 2002, just months before the die-off, cited “strong scientific
support” for most of FWS’s BiOp,186 although it found no scientific support for the BiOp’s
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Michelle Cole, With Deep Ties to Fish, Tribes Mourn Die-Off, THE OREGONIAN, at A17 (Oct. 6, 2002).
Id.
184
See, e.g. Jack Roberts, Letter to the Editor: Let science settle the matter, THE OREGONIAN F03 (Oct. 6, 2002)
185
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 121.
186
Id. at 123.
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call for minimum levels in Upper Klamath Lake to benefit the suckers.187 The report drew
similar conclusions regarding NMFS’s coho salmon BiOp, finding no “clear scientific or
technical support for increased minimum flows in the Klamath River main stem.”188 Irrigators
and their supporters, including those then in the federal government, claimed that the report
vindicated their position that the fish flows were unnecessary, ignoring the fact that the report
was equally critical of the Bureau’s proposal to decrease lake levels and river flows.189
The report and the reaction to it among government policymakers was particularly
enraging to the fisheries biologists who had spent substantial portions of their careers working
to perfect the balance between the needs of the fish and the local community.190 Many of these
area biologists felt the report’s findings “pretty much r[a]n counter to [those of] all the people
who work in the region”191 and were “rushed, simplistic, and unhelpful to public
understanding.”192 Instead of defusing tensions in the basin by providing a conclusion to a
decades-long conflict, the report “only made matters worse, ratcheting up an already hostile
environment”193 for government scientists in the area and came to be referred to as “combat
biology.”194 Although written by academics appointed by the federal government,195 the report
perpetuated an anti-science and anti-federal government sentiment that would continue to
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Id.
Id.
189
Id.
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Id. at 128.
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Robert F. Service, ‘Combat Biology’ on the Klamath, 300 SCIENCE 36 (2003) (quoting Mike Rode, a fisheries
biologist at the Cal. Dep’t of Fish and Game).
192
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 129.
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Service, supra note 191, at 36.
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Id. (quoting Ron Larson, a fisheries biologist with FWS in Klamath Falls, Oregon).
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See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 121.
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characterize the views of some of the participants in the ongoing conflict over Klamath basin
water and still does.196
Another problem with the NRC report was that it focused only on the threatened coho
salmon—not the chinook salmon that arrive sooner, making them the primary victims of the
fish kill.197 This feature does not make the report itself erroneous: the NRC’s task was to
consider the ESA obligations of the federal government and the extent to which the cutoff of
irrigation water was necessary to serve the needs of the three listed fish species.198 But it does
illustrate a problem with how the government report communicated to the public, especially
by those inclined to support the irrigators over the fish, the ecosystem of which they are a
part, and the Tribes. The report was touted by the Bush administration as proof that the
irrigation water cutoff was unjustified, but the administration failed to connect that cause to
the effect: the die-off of tens of thousands of chinook salmon. Although the later arrival of the
federally listed coho meant they were spared in this die-off, the event could be seen as a sort
of canary in the coal mine: release too much water for irrigation, and the result will be
numerous dead fish. Tasked with studying only the species entitled to ESA protections, the
NRC did as it was told, but the government’s failure to at least acknowledge the harms to the
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In summer 2021, for example, amid a mega-drought in the basin, supporters of the right-wing antigovernment activist Ammon Bundy set up protest camps near the headgates of the Klamath Project’s main
canal, threatening to illegally force them open in yet another summer of restrictions on irrigation water. Jason
Wilson, Amid mega-drought, rightwing militia stokes water rebellion in US west, THE GUARDIAN (June 8, 2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/08/klamath-falls-oregon-protests-ammon-bundy.
197
Michael Milstein & Jim Barnett, Salmon Die-Off Fears Become Harsh Reality, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 29,
2002)
198
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER
BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY xv (2004) (explaining the premise of the
report).
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commercially valuable chinook undermined the science in favor of policy goals such as
appeasing irrigators by increasing irrigation acres.199
The 2001 curtailment was the subject of longstanding court challenges, including a
takings claim, finally rejected by the Federal Circuit in Baley v. United States in 2017.200 The
Baley saga began in 2001, during ongoing protests over the curtailment of irrigation water,
when one group of irrigators sued the BOR, claiming that shutting off water deliveries from
the Klamath Project constituted a taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.201 The Court of Federal Claims decided that the BOR’s 2001 decision not to
provide water to the irrigators was indeed “a physical taking akin to the government’s seizure
of private property”202—and a permanent one.203 But the court concluded that the irrigators’
claimed rights were pre-empted by the senior water rights of the Klamath, Yurok, and Hoopa
Valley Tribes.204
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Milstein & Barnett, supra note 197. Commentators have noted parallels between the Bush administration’s
refusal to acknowledge the role of the release of irrigation water in the die-off and other issues where science
conflicted with the agency’s preferred policy, including the rejection of the Kyoto protocol and drilling for oil
in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Timothy Egan, As Thousands of Salmon Die, Fight for River Erupts Again,
N.Y. Times (Sept. 28, 2002) https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/28/us/as-thousands-of-salmon-die-fight-forriver-erupts-again.html. A spokesman for Republicans for Environmental Protection noted “a pattern here that
if the science is consistent with the political agenda, then it’s sound science. If it’s not consistent with the
political agenda, they need more information.” Id. Members of the public expressed similar sentiments in the
editorial sections of area newspapers, including one commentator who noted that the Bush administration’s
response was “the same distortion of scientific certainty President Bush uses to ignore global warming . . .
Such lies reveal an administration that serves only friends and ideology and unscrupulously manipulates
science to its own ends.” Stephen Bachhuber, Letter to the Editor: Floating fish are proof enough, THE OREGONIAN
F03 (Oct. 6, 2002).
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Baley v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 668 (2017).
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Id.; see also Monte Mills, Beyond Constitutional Frontiers: Tribal Rights, Resources, and Reform, 2019 ABA SEER
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 8 (Sept. 13, 2019).
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Id. at 9.
203
Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 668; see also Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021) (concluding
that a California statute granting labor organizations a right of access to an agricultural employers’ property for
unionization to be a permanent physical per se taking).
204
Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 679–80.
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In their 1864 treaty with the United States, the Klamath Tribes reserved the “exclusive
right of taking fish in the streams and lakes that were included as part of the Klamath Indian
Reservation.”205 A federal court water rights adjudication later determined that under this
treaty language recognized that the Klamath Tribes hold “a water right to support game and
fish adequate to the needs of Indian hunters and fishers,” with a priority date of time
immemorial.206 The Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes’ similar rights dated, at the latest, to
1891: the year of the last presidential Executive Order in the series that “established, extended,
and combined the Klamath and Hoopa Valley Reservations in California.”207 The irrigators’
rights, on the other hand, dated to only 1905: the earliest possible date by which
appropriations were made for the Klamath Project.208 Therefore, under the doctrine of prior
appropriation,209 the Tribes’ reserved rights are senior to the water rights held by the irrigators,
who have “no entitlement to receive any water until the Tribes senior rights [are] fully
satisfied”210—meaning until sufficient water had been reserved to support suitable habitat for
the SONCC coho salmon in the river as well as for the Koptu, and the C’waam in the lake.211

205

Id. at 633.
Id. (quoting United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983)). Unlike the Stevens Treaty rights
of the tribes in the Columbia basin and Puget Sound basin, the fishing rights of the Klamath Tribes don’t
include off-reservation rights, and due to termination in the 1960s, the Tribes no longer have a reservation. See
DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 64–65 (discussing the termination of the Klamath Tribes).
207
Id.
208
Mills, supra note 201, at 9.
209
Prior appropriation water law gives priority to first-in-time (senior) rights putting water to “beneficial use”
over later (junior) rights. There is no sharing of water shortages. See id. at 4.
210
Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 679.
211
Id. at 680 (using the English words for the Koptu and C’waam: the Lost River and shortnose suckers). See id.
at 679-80:
The court, therefore, holds that, because the Tribes held water rights to Klamath Project water that
were senior to those held by all remaining plaintiff class members, and because the Tribes water rights
were at least co-extensive to the amount of water that was required by defendant to satisfy its
obligations under the Endangered Species Act concerning the Lost River and shortnose suckers and
the coho salmon in 2001, plaintiffs had no entitlement to receive any water before the government had
satisfied what it determined to be its obligations under the Endangered Species Act and its Tribal
Trust responsibilities.
206
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision in 2019, rejecting the irrigators’ argument
on appeal that the tribes’ reserved water rights did not extend to Upper Klamath Lake, and
thus Klamath Project Water.212 The court reasoned that since the Klamath Tribes hold “an
implied right to water to the extent necessary to accomplish hunting, fishing, and gathering
on the former reservation,” they have “the right to prevent appropriators from utilizing water
in a way that depletes adjoined water sources below a level that damages the habitat of the
fish they have a right to take.”213 Creating some interesting precedent concerning reserved
rights’ remedies, the court expressly ruled that the fact that Upper Klamath Lake was over
200 miles from the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes’ reservations does not mean those tribes’
lacked water rights in the lake.214 According to the Federal Circuit, since these tribes have
reserved rights to take fish from the Klamath River within their reservations, 215 they also
possess an “implied water right that includes the Klamath River and the flows therein as
controlled by the Iron Gate Dam,” as the river and its flows provide the salmon with their
habitat.216 Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court and ruled that because the
irrigators’ water rights were subordinate to the Tribes’ senior rights, the irrigators’ had no
compensable right for the 2001 government restrictions on irrigation water deliveries that
benefited the Tribes’ fishing rights.217
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Baley v. United States, 942 F.3d 1312, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id.
214
Id. at 1338–39.
215
Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 634.
216
Baley, 942 F.3d at 1339.
217
Id. at 1341. On the other side of the water rights debate, following the die-off, the Yurok Tribe sued BOR to
compel the agency to operate the Klamath Project in a manner consistent with the Tribe’s fishing rights.
Order, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Civ. No. C 02-02006 SBA,
March 8, 2005, http://www.klamathbasincrisis.org/pdf-files/pcffayurokOrder%20030905.pdf. The District
Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the claim for mootness, ruling that the Tribe had failed
to show another fish kill was likely, and because the Tribe could not bring a generalized challenge to the
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VI.

THE FEDERAL POWER ACT AND SECTION 401 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
PROTECTORS

AS SALMON

As discussed in Part II above, the FPA authorized FERC to license nonfederal
hydroelectric projects on navigable waters of the U.S.218 FERC’s licensing authority is subject
to sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA, which give federal land managers and fishery agencies,
respectively, authority to impose mandatory conditions on the licenses. 219 As a result, the
FPA, together with state certification authority under section 401 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA), can be a powerful tool for protecting salmon and its habitat.
A.

Section 4(e): Conditioning Authority of Federal Land Management Agencies
Section 4(e) of the FPA authorizes FERC to issue licenses for hydroelectric projects

located on public lands and reservations.220 But to license such a project, FERC must: (1) find
that the project “will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such
reservation was created or acquired”; and (2) include in the license any conditions “deem[ed]
necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of such reservation” by the Secretary of
the department administering the reservation.221
Both the D.C. Circuit and Ninth Circuit have held that FERC must independently
evaluate a reservation’s purpose,222 focusing on the “statutorily prescribed purposes”223 of the
reservation rather than deference to the reservation’s administering agency’s interpretation of
Klamath Project’s operations. See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 76. Although the order
acknowledged the federal government’s trust responsibilities to the Tribe and its fishing rights, the court was
apparently reluctant to dictate BOR’s operations. Id.
218
FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2018).
219
Id. §§ 797(e), 811.
220
Id. § 797(e).
221
Id.
222
Keating v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 114 F.3d 1265, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rainsong Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 106 F.3d 269, 275 (9th Cir. 1997).
223
Rainsong, 106 F.3d at 275.
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consistency between the project and the reservation’s purpose.224 But once the Secretary of the
relevant land management department concludes that a condition is necessary to protect the
reservation, the Supreme Court ruled in Escondido Mutual Water Company v. La Jolla Band of
Mission Indians that “the Commission is required to adopt [the condition] as its own.”225 The
Court observed that section 4(e) uses mandatory language to describe the administering
Secretary’s conditioning authority: the license “shall be subject to and contain such conditions
. . . .”226 The provision therefore “requires [FERC] to accept without modification any license
conditions recommended by the Secretary.”227 FERC may challenge the condition before a
United States court of appeals,228 but courts are “obligated to sustain [the conditions] if they
are reasonably related to that goal, otherwise consistent with the FPA, and supported by
substantial evidence.”229 In short, § 4(e) gives land management agencies broad authority to
condition FERC-licensed projects, including at relicensing.
B.

Section 18: Conditioning Authority of Federal Fisheries Agencies

224

Keating, 114 F.3d at 1268.
466 U.S. 765 (1984).
226
FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2018) (emphasis added).
227
Escondido, 466 U.S. at 771.
228
16 U.S.C. § 825(b).
229
Escondido, 466 U.S. at 778. The § 4(e) authority of the land management agencies is, however, only
applicable when a project is located within the boundaries of a reservation. Id. at 781. In Escondido, for
example, while the Court required FERC to incorporate conditions dictated by the Secretary of the Interior to
protect the purposes of several Indian Reservations through which the proposed project passed, id. at 779,
FERC was not obligated to include conditions the Secretary intended for the protection of the water usage of
three reservations on which no actual project facilities would be located. Id. at 780–81. The Court reasoned
that § 4(e) gives the Secretary conditioning authority over a project licensed “within” any reservation; it
“imposes no obligation on [FERC] or power on the Secretary with respect to reservations that may somehow
be affected by, but will contain no part of, the licensed project works.” Id. The D.C. Circuit has, however,
interpreted Escondido to mean that so long as some part of the licensed project is within the reservation, even if
it is but a small part, that is sufficient to trigger § 4(e) conditioning authority for the project as a whole. City of
Tacoma v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53, 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
225
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The purpose of section 18 of the FPA is “to provide for ‘safe and timely fish passage’
as well as other ‘fish and wildlife benefits both downstream and upstream of a project.’” 230
This provision gives the federal fishery agencies—U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) (for
freshwater and anadromous species) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (for
marine species)— mandatory conditioning authority to prescribe “fishways.”231
The FPA does not define “fishways.” In 1991, FERC issued a regulatory definition of
“fishways,”232 but it was vacated by Congress in the 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPAct).233 The
EPAct provided FERC with guidance on issuing a new definition, including that any new
definition should include both upstream and downstream passage, but it did not require
FERC to take such action, and the agency has never done so.234 The Department of Interior
(which houses FWS) and Department of Commerce (which houses NMFS) did issue a
proposed policy regarding section 18 fishway prescriptions in 2000, but the agencies never
adoption a final policy.235
Despite the lack of a clear formal definition, the Ninth Circuit in American Rivers v.
FERC applied Escondido to section 18 fishway prescriptions, holding that FERC “may not
modify, reject, or reclassify any prescriptions submitted by the Secretaries under color of

230

Wis. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Pub. L. No. 102-486,
§ 1701(b), 106 Stat. 2776, 3008 (1992); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-934, at 23 (1986)).
231
16 U.S.C. § 811.
232
Regulations Governing Submittal of Proposed Hydropower License Conditions and Other Matters, 56 Fed.
Reg. 23,108, 23,109 (May 20, 1991).
233
Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1701(b), 106 Stat. 2776, 3008. FERC’s regulatory definition of fishway included
only structures used for the upstream passage of fish around or through a hydropower project. 56 Fed. Reg. at
23,109. When Congress vacated this definition, it clarified that any future definition of “fishway” must include
structures to foster both upstream and downstream passage of fish. 16 U.S.C. § 811 note.
234
Id.
235
Notice of Proposed Interagency Policy on the Prescription of Fishways Under Section 18 of the Federal
Power Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,898 (Dec. 22, 2000).
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section 18.”236 As did the Supreme Court in Escondido, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
mandatory language in section 18: FERC “shall require the construction, maintenance, and
operation by a licensee at its own expense of . . . such fishways as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior of the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate.”237 Further, the court
noted that in the EPAct, “Congress explicitly considered and rejected amendments to section
18 that would have limited the Department of the Interior’s authority to prescribe
fishways.”238 If FERC disagrees with the scope of a fishway prescription, its only options are
to “withhold a license altogether or voice its concerns in the court of appeals.”239
C.

CWA Section 401: State Certification
Section 401 of the CWA requires applicants for federal licenses or permits for activities

that might result in a discharge into navigable waters to provide the federal licensing agency
with a certification from the state in which the discharge originates that it will comply with
various state water quality standards, effluent limitations, technological standards, and toxic
pretreatment requirements.240 This provision clearly applies to federally licensed hydroelectric
facilities241 and requires not only that the licensed activity be consistent with CWA, but also
with “any other appropriate requirements of State [and Tribal] law.”242 And once “the
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187 F.3d 1007, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1206 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 811).
238
Id. at 1208.
239
Id. at 1210.
240
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2018).
241
See S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 47 U.S. 370, 384–87 (2006); see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 709 (noting that the hydroelectric project at issue “may result in
discharges into the Dosewallips River,” and petitioners were therefore “required to obtain state certification of
the project pursuant to § 401 of the Clean Water Act”).
242
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
237
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threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, is satisfied,” section 401(d) authorizes
“conditions and limitations on the activity as a whole,” not just the discharge itself. 243
D. The Effect of Sections 4(e), 18, and 401 on the Relicensing of the Klamath Dams
With the expiration of its original FERC license to operate the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project looming in 2006, PacifiCorp applied for relicensing in 2004.244 FERC issued a notice
of the availability of the license application and, in response, FWS and NMFS filed joint
preliminary mandatory fishway prescriptions under section 18 of the FPA. The agencies
stated that these prescriptions would provide “safe, timely, and effective upstream and
downstream fish passage facilities” for aquatic species, including the Lost River and shortnose
suckers, SONCC coho salmon, resident trout, chinook salmon, steelhead, and Pacific
lamprey.245 An analysis commissioned by the California Energy Commission estimated that
the cost of implementing these preliminary prescriptions could reach $300 million.246 Dam
removal, in contrast, was forecast to cost approximately $100 million.247
BLM and BOR both filed preliminary mandatory conditions under § 4(e). 248 BLM
administers lands adjacent to the J.C. Doyle developments under either the Revested Oregon
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CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, KLAMATH BASIN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 3 (2014) [hereinafter
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and California Railroad Lands Act, which called for these lands to be “conserved and
perpetuated” and managed as timberlands and power site lands, or Power Site Reserve No.
258, which withdrew land from “settlement, location, sale, or entry” and reserved it for use
as a “water-power site.”249
After evaluating the federal land managers’ section 4(e) and 18 prescriptions and
conditions, plus FERC’s recommended conditions for relicensing, PacifiCorp determined
their implementation “would cause the project to operate at an annual net loss.” 250 Soon
thereafter, PacifiCorp began settlement discussions “to resolve issues related to relicensing of
the [KHP].”251 These discussions ultimately led to the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement
Agreement (KHSA), signed on February 18, 2010 by more than 40 stakeholders, including
federal agencies, the states of California and Oregon, Native American tribes, counties,
irrigators, conservation groups, and fishing groups.252 In 2016, the parties amended the KHSA
to provide for the transfer and decommissioning of the four hydroelectric dams through FPA
procedures.253 PacifiCorp was motivated to consider dam removal as a potential solution for
its Klamath hydroelectric developments and to enter into the KHSA because the KHSA
would better protect PacifiCorp and its customers from risk and cost volatility as compared
to pursuing relicensing.254
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Order Amending License and Deferring Consideration of Transfer Application, 162 FERC ¶ 61,236 at P. 7 (March
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The KHSA and the removal of the four KHP dams offer hope for the Klamath’s fish,
particularly its federally listed salmon and suckers. Without the conditioning provisions of
the FPA and the CWA, it is highly unlikely that the utility would have had the motivation
for this historic agreement. The KHSA and other related agreements are discussed further, in
Part VII.
VII.

THE AGREEMENTS TO REMOVE THE DAMS
In light of the costly conditions issued by the fisheries agencies and BLM under their

FPA mandatory conditioning authority,255 it became clear that the Klamath dams had become
“toxic assets” for Pacificorp.256 The 2005 EPAct had been enacted between PacifCorp’s 2004
relicensing application and the agencies’ 2006 issuance of their prescriptions and conditions,
giving PacifiCorp access to an administrative hearing mechanism that would allow it to
challenge the factual bases for the prescriptions and conditions. 257 PacifiCorp’s use of this
procedure led to a hearing, but its efforts were almost entirely unsuccessful: the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld twelve of the fourteen conditions and prescriptions
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See supra footnotes 258–62 and accompanying text.
Schwartz, supra note 82.
257
FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2018). The legislation allows license applicants and any party to the licensing
proceeding to seek an agency trial-type hearing to resolve any disputed issues of material fact regarding
fishway prescriptions prescribed under FPA sections 4(e) and 18. Id. Hearings are conducted by the relevant
resource agency. Id. See also Adell L. Amos, Dam Removal and Hydropower Production in the United States Ushering
in a New Era, 29 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 1, 23 (2014) (noting Congress enacted the EPAct between Pacificorp’s
2004 relicensing application and federal agencies’ submissions of conditions and prescriptions for the Klamath
dams). The hydropower industry had fought to get rid of FPA sections 4(e) and 18 altogether, but the best they
could accomplish was the establishment of these procedures. See Adell Louise Amos, Hydropower Reform and
the Impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on the Klamath Basin: Renewed Optimism or Same Old Song?, 22 J. ENV’T
LAW & LITIG. 1, 10 (2007) (discussing the hydropower industry’s years of attempt seeking legislation to
weaken FPA sections 4(e) and 18, ultimately leading to the administrative hearing process provided in the
2005 EPAct). The procedures allow hydropower industry attorneys an opportunity to cross-examine
conditioning officials in formal hearings in the hope of showing the conditions to be unreasonable, see id. at 17
(discussing cross-examination), making the relicensing process more time-consuming and expensive. See id. at
15 (noting the EPAct hearing procedures are viewed by some as “overly burdensome and cost-prohibitive”).
The EPAct also allowed the license applicant or any party to the licensing proceeding to propose alternative
conditions or prescriptions. See FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 823(d) (2018). But ultimately, the final decision still rests
with the federal land managers or fishery agencies. See id.
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submitted by the agencies, and FERC later conditioned a new license on the construction of
fish ladders on the dams as recommended by the agencies.258 Faced with a choice between the
costly retrofitting of the dams for fish passage, and the possibility of dam removal at about
half the price,259 PacifiCorp initiated settlement discussions with a group of stakeholders in
hopes of resolving the issues surrounding relicensing.260 Facilitated by the federal
government,261 these settlement discussions eventually led to two agreements signed in
January 2010: the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) and the Klamath Basin
Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA).262
More than forty parties agreed to the KBRA, including state agencies from California
and Oregon, the Klamath Tribes, the Karuk Tribe, the Yurok Tribe, several counties in
California and Oregon, multiple parties related to the Klamath Reclamation Project,
irrigators, and several conservation and outdoor recreation organizations.263 The stated goals
of the KBRA were to:
(i) restore and sustain natural production and provide for Full Participation in
Harvest Opportunities of Fish Species throughout the Klamath Basin; (ii)
establish reliable water and power supplies which sustain agricultural uses and
communities and National Wildlife Refuges; (iii) contribute to the public
welfare and the sustainability of all Klamath Basin communities through these
and other measures provided herein . . . .264
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More specifically, the project was a type of water agreement in which the parties agreed to
support diversions for irrigators and federal wildlife refuges that correlated to a given year’s
forecast inflows into Upper Klamath Lake, with surplus flows not otherwise subject to valid
water rights allocated to other uses, such as instream flows.265 Holders of existing diversionary
water rights did not, however, abandon those rights,266 thus retaining their right to claim
compensation for a takings due to any reallocation imposed by the KBRA.
To address the concerns of environmental interests, the KBRA provided additional
federal and state funding for fisheries restoration267 and to purchase and retire existing water
rights,268 allowed some of the surplus flows to support environmental concerns,269 and
provided assurances for dam removal under the KHSA.270 The three tribes who were party to
the agreement offered their support and agreed not to make a “call” on certain water rights 271
in exchange for various restoration actions, federal restoration of fisheries, and economic
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CRS KBSA REPORT, supra note 244, at 5.
KBRA, supra note 263, at E.15.
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268
Id. at 107–11.
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Id. at 142–43.
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Id. at 96.
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Beginning in the 1970s and still pending today, Oregon undertook a water rights adjudication to resolve
uncertainties about quantification and priority dates of water rights in the Klamath Basin. CRS, supra note 269
at 4. The agency with primary responsibility for the adjudication, the Oregon Water Resources Department
(OWRD) filed final findings with the state court in 2013 which found, among other things, that the most
senior claims are those held in trust by the United States for the Klamath Tribes. Id. In the summer of 2013,
the Tribes made a “call” on these rights for the first time, leading to reduced water supplies for irrigators and
prompting protests from farmers and ranchers and the decision by Klamath County to pull out of the
settlement agreements. See McCool, supra note 27, at 98. The Tribes have made several additional calls on
their water rights since, including one in March 2021. News Release, Oregon Water Resources Dep’t, Water
Resources Department to Begin Water Regulation in Portions of the Klamath Basin,
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aid.272 The agreement also promised finding to area irrigators to develop low-cost power to
replace that previously generated by the Klamath dams.273
As originally enacted, the KHSA laid a roadmap for the eventual removal of the four
Klamath dams, including “additional studies, environmental review, and, following the
passage of federal legislation, a decision by the Secretary of the Interior regarding whether
removal of [the dams’] should proceed.”274 The parties to the KHSA agreed to it in
conjunction with the KBRA, and the parties to both understood that the two agreements were
complementary and assumed they would not proceed independently.275
Both the 2010 KHSA and the KBRA required congressional consent and funding to
be implemented in full.276 The original deadline was set for 2012, but was later extended to
2014, and then 2015.277 In 2014, Oregon Democratic Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley
and California Democratic Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein introduced a bill in
Congress to authorize the KHSA, KBRA, and a third settlement, the Upper Klamath Basin
Settlement Agreement.278 But recent conflicts in the Klamath Basin spurred opposition to the
agreements in Congress and from local representatives, particularly a protest over a decision
of the state’s water resources department in a water rights adjudication that concluded the
Klamath Tribes’ water rights were the most senior in the basin, leading to reduced water
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supplies for irrigators in the dry summer of 2013.279 The Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee recommended passage of the bill, but the Senate failed to act on the bill before the
end of the congressional session in 2014.280
In 2015, Senator Wyden reintroduced the bill, with an authorization deadline of
December of that year.281 The bill was defeated, with opposition led by Oregon Republican
Congressman Greg Walden.282 Walden opposed any settlement that included dam removal283
and drafted a competing bill that did not include dam removal but added unrelated provisions
that would transfer national forest land to local counties as a poison pill. 284 The impasse
between the Senate bill and Walden’s House bill doomed all three settlements.285
Congress’s failure to meet the agreements’ 2015 authorization deadline triggered the
KHSA’s dispute resolution procedures.286 After extensive dispute resolution meetings, in 2016
Oregon, California, the Departments of Interior and Commerce, and PacifiCorp proposed an
amended KHSA “that would eliminate the need for federal legislation and instead achieve
dam removal through a license transfer and surrender process.”287 The amended KHSA also
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designated Klamath River Renewal Corporation (KRRC), a nonprofit organization formed
by the agreement signatories for the purposes of restoring the Klamath Basin, as the “Dam
Removal Entity,” endowing it with the responsibility of removing the dams under the
amended KHSA. The parties — PacifiCorp, California, Oregon, Interior, NMFS, the Yurok
Tribe, and the Karuk Tribe— executed the amended KHSA on April 6, 2016.
Unlike the KHSA, the KBRA was not revived after Congress’s failure to authorize it
by its expiration date.288 Its demise untethered the amended KHSA from the KBRA, which
was denigrated by some conservation groups as “a wildly expensive and controversial water
deal.”289 Without the need for congressional action, the amended KHSA has allowed the dam
removal process to move forward. Where the 2010 agreements would have required $800
million in federal funding to remove the dams and implement their water deals, the amended
KHSA provides for funding from three sources: 1) a surcharge on PacifiCorp’s Oregon
customers; 2) a surcharge on PacifiCorp’s California customers; and 3) a California Bond
Measure.290 The contribution from the states is capped at $450 million, which the parties
estimate will be more than sufficient to fund the removal of the dams.291
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In 2020, California, Oregon, the Yurok Tribe, the Karuk Tribe, PacifiCorp, and
KRRC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) describing how they will
implement the amended KHSA.292 The MOA and its origins are discussed in the next Part.
VIII. THE 2020 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
The amended KHSA removed the fate of the Klamath dams from the hands of
Congress and placed it squarely with FERC, California, Oregon, PacifiCorp, and KRRC: in
order for the dams to be removed under the amended KHSA, the parties must successfully
complete FERC’s license transfer and surrender process.293 The parties to the amended KHSA
took a major step forward in this process in September 2016, when PacifiCorp and KRRC
filed an application to amend the KHP license to administratively remove the four dams from
the license and place them into a new license for what would be known as the “Lower
Klamath Project,” and then to transfer that license from PacifiCorp to KRRC. 294
In June 2020, FERC approved a partial transfer of the Lower Klamath Project license
to KRRC, but made the transfer contingent on PacifiCorp remaining on as a co-licensee.
FERC was concerned that given the size of the decommissioning and removal project, the
uncertainties around the final design and execution of the project, and the risks to public safety
and the environment from dam removal, KRRC may not have the funding or expertise to
successfully complete the proposed project.295 Requiring PacifiCorp to remain as a co-licensee
would be in the public interest, according to FERC, as the arrangement would allow
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PacifiCorp to provide legal and technical support while ensuring that sufficient funding would
be available to complete the decommissioning.296
But PacifiCorp and the other parties to the amended KHSA were not satisfied with
this arrangement. The amended KHSA called for the transfer of the license from PacifiCorp
to KRRC. The main appeal of the amended KHSA for PacifiCorp was the financial certainty
the license transfer would present: the transfer would protect PacifiCorp from any liability for
damages caused by the dams’ removal, and the cost cap contained in the amended KHSA
meant PacifiCorp’s customers were assured of “prudent and reasonable long-term utility
rates.”297 PacifiCorp considered these benefits from the amended KHSA to be central to the
utility’s willingness to voluntarily transfer the dams for removal.298 The parties therefore began
discussions on how best to move forward, leading them to enter a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) in November 2020. Despite their absence from the FERC proceedings,
the Karuk and Yurok Tribes joined PacifiCorp, Oregon, California, and KRRC in the
MOA.299 In the MOA, the parties commit to removal of the dams and the restoration of a
free-flowing Klamath River with viable fish passage.300
The core of the MOA calls for the states to become co-licensees with KRRC in order
to relieve PacifiCorp of that responsibility, while addressing FERC’s concerns about KRRC’s
ability to complete the decommissioning as a sole licensee.301 The parties agreed, among other
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things, that KRRC and PacifiCorp would file an amended license surrender application
notifying FERC that PacifiCorp would not accept status as a co-licensee and instead
proposing that the states become co-licensees with KRRC.302 The MOA also added more
contingency funding to help assure FERC that sufficient funding would be available to
complete the decommissioning.303 Although the parties continued to assert that the cost of the
Lower Klamath Hydroelectric Project would not likely exceed the $450 million allocated in
the Amended KHSA, they offered an additional contingency funding of $45 million to ensure
the dam removal would be completed and further agreed to share equally in any additional
costs.304
The MOA and the new applications for transfer apparently assuaged FERC’s
concerns, because in June 2021 FERC approved the transfer of the license for the Lower
Klamath Hydroelectric Project from PacifiCorp to KRRC, California, and Oregon as colicensees.305 FERC explained that a transfer may be approved if the applicant shows that the
“transferee is qualified to hold the license and operate the project, and that a transfer is in the
public interest.”306 Although the previous application to transfer the license in full to KRRC
was not, according to FERC, in the public interest due to FERC’s concerns that KRRC alone
had the legal and technical expertise of funding to complete the decommissioning, as well
FERC’s reluctance to allow PacifiCorp to relieve itself of all liability for the
decommissioning,307 the new application—adding the states as co-licensees in lieu of
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PacifiCorp—adequately addressed these concerns,308 given the states’ extensive experience
with large infrastructure, including dam removal.309 Further, FERC decided that PacifiCorp’s
commitment to provide additional funding relieved FERC’s concerns about PacifiCorp fully
escaping liability.310
As of April 2022, FERC had yet to approve the KRRC and PacifiCorp’s amended
license surrender application, but in the MOA the parties estimated that such an order might
come during the first quarter of 2022, allowing for the dam removal process to begin in
2023.311 That timeline did not materialized, as FERC released a February 2022 draft
environmental impact statement (DEIS) endorsing license surrender and decommissioning in
February 2022.312 FERC has not yet stated when it expects to release its final Environmental
Impact Statement (FEIS) for the license surrender and decommissioning, it will likely be after
the MOA’s estimate timeline. Although removal could still begin in 2023, a more likely
scenario now is 2024.313 Timing aside, the DEIS pointed in the direction of dam removal
because FERC recommended both license surrender and decommissioning with the inclusion
of all of KRRC and PacifiCorp’s proposed mitigation measures, along with the conditions
from the water quality certifications issued by California and Oregon and the biological
opinions of NMFS and FWS, and additional recommendations from FERC’s staff.314 FERC
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suggested that this resolution will adequately protect environmental and restore
environmental resources, maximize benefits to the chinook salmon fishery, and restore the
landscape to a more natural state.315 FERC also found that any adverse environmental effects
and loss of power generation would be outweighed by the long-term benefits of
decommissioning.316 Barring any extraordinary developments, the Klamath dams appear
poised for decommissioning and removal in the near future.
IX.

CONCLUSION
The FPA has led to dam removals throughout the country,317 and the removal of the

Klamath dams would be the largest so far of any dam removal in the history of the United
States.318 Yet, the importance of the FPA and § 401 of the CWA as environmental
remediation

provisions—interjecting

environmental

pluralism

through

shared

decisionmaking on hydropower licensing with federal land managers and fishery agencies
and state water quality agencies—is often overlooked.319 The licensing process is timeconsuming, and its effects enduring due to the lengthy terms of hydropower licenses.320 The
proper exercise of conditioning authority should be a function of ecological studies which
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the licensing process should trigger, perhaps via NEPA procedures. Proponents of dam
removal therefore need be artful in identifying federal and state officials with conditioning
authority and marshal public support.
The 2020 MOA and FERC’s subsequent approval of the license transfer application
in 2021 were hailed by supporters of dam removal via the FERC license transfer and
surrender process as a great victory for the Klamath River basin.321 The release of the 2022
DEIS likewise was welcomed as further affirmation of the importance of dam removal for
fisheries restoration and improved water quality.322 If FERC grants the surrender license, the
removal of the Klamath dams will open over 400 miles of habitat to spawning and rearing
of salmon and other anadromous fish and improving water quality and temperature
conditions on the Klamath River.323
There does not seem to be much reason to doubt that FERC will approve the surrender
application with the modifications recommended in the DEIS. FERC’s receptiveness to the
2020 MOA as a remedy for its concerns regarding transferring the license in full to KRRC
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suggests that the Commission is open to dialogue with the parties to explore different options.
The removal has already received CWA § 401 certifications from both California and Oregon,
so the largest remaining hurdle is the completion of the NEPA analysis. 324 But the
recommended action in the DEIS bodes well for the remainder of this process, as FERC
accepts comments and completes its FEIS, particularly because this will be the fourth time
the project, in some form, has gone through the NEPA process. 325 The parties have thus built
up a large record in support of surrender and removal.326 Further, what little electric power is
currently produced by the four dams would be more than offset by power generated by new
wind farms,327 and PacifiCorp also plans to add additional solar resources to its portfolio. 328
FERC should therefore have no qualms about the effects of removing the dams’ contributions
from the grid.329
Dam removal does, however, come with some risks that might give FERC pause, or
perhaps inspire litigation from dam removal opponents in the event that FERC does approve
the license surrender application. Massive amounts of sediment have been building up behind
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these dams since the completion of Copco 1 in 1918, and removing these dams will mobilize
these sediments.330 In addition to increasing turbidity in the river and its tributaries, which can
disrupt fish migrations and fill the small spaces in the substrate where fish embryos incubate,
the sediment may contain toxic materials such as mercury331 and polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs).332 Once suspended in the water column, these toxins may contaminate food webs, 333
prompting both ecological and public health concerns. Dam removal can also temporarily
reduce spawning and rearing habitat immediately downstream, and spread disease from
species once isolated by dams to species further downstream.334 At least one study, however,
has found that the benefits of removing the Klamath River dams, such as improvement in
water quality and increased access to spawning and rearing habitat, will outweigh these
potential costs.335 And in its DEIS for license surrender and decommissioning, FERC
concluded that while the mobilization of sediments may cause some short-term adverse
effects, in the long-term the effects would actually be beneficial, as the mobilization would
help restore the natural geomorphology and natural sediment transport processes of certain
parts of the Klamath basin.336 In other areas, adverse effects from sediment mobilization
would be minimized by mitigation measures.337
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Most of the risks of dam removal will be temporary, as the excess suspended sediment
will likely be cleared by the high flows resulting from dam removal within one year,338 and
sediment transport rates can return to background levels within months, or even weeks.339
Even a worst-case scenario for salmon would be a one-time loss potentially resulting in
reductions in adult fall-run chinook spawners three and four years following dam removal.340
A full recovery for the salmon can be expected within five years of dam removal, 341 perhaps
sooner when factoring in the active restoration efforts KRRC plans to undertake.
A more disconcerting question is whether the removal of the Klamath dams will be
enough to save its salmon, or if all of this effort will be too little too late. Spring 2021 saw yet
another massive fish kill resulting from disease spread widely and easily amid drought
conditions and increased water temperatures.342 Although at present experts generally agree
that the Klamath salmon, being highly resilient creatures, will survive, the ecosystem stands
at the edge of a dangerous cliff.343 FERC must act expediently if the removal project is to
remain on track for a 2023 removal.344
But the success of the removal of the Edwards dam from Maine’s Kennebec River in
1999 provides significant hope that the removal of the Klamath dams will be the turning point
the Klamath basin needs. Almost immediately following the removal of the Edwards dam,
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native fish re-populated upstream areas previously inaccessible to them.345 A decade after the
Edwards dam removal, the Kennebec had become home to the largest migration of alewives
on the eastern seaboard, and the restoration of the river’s fish benefitted predator populations,
and thus the entire food web, as well.346 Water quality also improved, and the area’s human
population began recreating on the river and using it as inspiration for economic
development.347 August, Maine, for example, revitalized its riverfront, converting the area
once occupied by a textile mill and the dam into a park that hosts numerous community
events, including a weekly farmers’ market, a boat launch, and a nature trail.348
Studies of other river systems after the removal of dams have found similarly
promising results regarding ecological recovery in the years following removal. Following the
removal of Hemlock Dam from Trout Creek in Washington State, one study found increased
quality and quantity of aquatic habitat for fish.349 And despite an initial lag, likely caused by
an initial period of unstable substrate and low substrate heterogeneity immediately following
the dam removal, the study found a considerable improvement in benthic macroinvertebrate
communities within two years of dam removal.350 On the Elwha River, the number of salmon
redds tripled between the first and third years following the removal of the Elwha Dam. 351

345

Tara Lohan, How Removing One Maine Dam 20 Years Ago Changed Everything, THE REVELATOR (Feb. 11,
2019), https://therevelator.org/edwards-dam-removal/.
346
Andrew Fahlund, River Rebirth: Removing Edwards Dam on Maine’s Kennebec River, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/lessons-from-the-field-edwards-dam-removalmaine (last visited March 13, 2022).
347
Lohan, supra note 345.
348
Fahlund, supra note 346.
349
S.M. Claeson & B. Coffin, Physical and Biological Responses to an Alternative Removal Strategy of a ModerateSized Dam in Washington, USA, 32 RIVER RES. APPLIC. 1143, 1151 (2015).
350
Id.
351
Foley, supra note 339, at 5235.

55
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4061159

And on the White Salmon River, Pacific lamprey recolonized the basin upstream of where
the Condit Dam once blocked upstream passage within four years of dam removal.352
The chances of a successful dam removal may also be bolstered by the Yurok Tribe’s
2019 resolution declaring rights of personhood for the Klamath River.353 The resolution
enables the river to have its rights adjudicated in Yurok Tribal Court,354 which can include the
prosecution of both tribe members and non-members or entities that violate the river’s
rights.355 The Tribe is still in the final stages of developing a more extensive ordinance
following the resolution, so has not yet taken action under it.356 But it could present
opportunities to speed dam removal or influence management of the river in the interim.
The removal of the Klamath dams may be a watershed moment for salmon in the
Pacific Northwest and the diverse stakeholders who depend on these creatures and a healthy
Klamath River for their culture, livelihoods, health, and recreation. The years of process and
negotiations endured by dam removal advocates could illuminate a path forward for the
removal of more nonfederal hydroelectric dams via the FERC license transfer and surrender
process, marking a new era in ecological restoration of the nation’s rivers.
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